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*Pub. Co.*, 72 Mich., 560. The law will presume general damage to result from the publication of defamatory matter, although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted, *Hanson v. Krehbiel*, 68 Kan., 670, the words from which the law presumes injury in such case being deemed actionable *per se*. *Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co.*, 35 Minn., 251. Accordingly, it may be stated as a general proposition that words written or printed may be libelous and actionable *per se*, that is actionable without any allegations of special damages, if they tend to expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or aversion, and to induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse and society, even though the same words if spoken would not have been actionable. *Farley v. Evening Chronicle Pub. Co.*, 113 Mo. App., 216; *Obaugh v. Finn*, 4 Ark., 110. In order to be libelous *per se* it is not essential that the words should contain an imputation of crime, *Gallagher v. Bryant*, 44 N. Y. App. Div., 527, nor is scandalous matter necessary to make a libel. *Watson v. Trask*, 6 Ohio, 531. Mere general abuse and scurrility, however ill-natured and vexatious, is no more actionable when written than when spoken, if it does not convey degrading charges or imputations. *Rice v. Simmons*, 2 Harr. (Del.), 417. Some courts hold that malice is not a necessary ingredient to a cause of action for libel or slander. *Cady v. Brooklyn Union Pub. Co.*, 51 N. Y. Supp., 198. But in all courts the law implies malice from the publication of words actionable *per se*, and no actual malice is essential to a recovery. *Mitchell v. Milholland*, 106 Ill., 175; *Owen v. Dewey*, 107 Mich., 67.

LIBEL AND SLANDER—PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS—DISCHARGE OF DUTY TO PUBLIC.—*BINGHAM v. GAYNOR*, 96 N. E., 84 (N. Y.).—*Held*, that a communication concerning a public official, made to his superior or person empowered to redress a wrong, is privileged, though the statements are untrue, where the person making them acts in good faith and has a legal or moral duty as a citizen or otherwise to make such communication.

To comment upon the acts or conduct of a public man is the right of every citizen. *Duffy v. N. Y. Evening Post Co.*, 96 N. Y. Supp., 629. No action for libel or slander lies for a petition or remonstrance imputing want of integrity or other cause of unfitness to a public officer or employee, subject to removal by or under the supervision of the officer or board to whom the communication is addressed, provided such communication be made in good faith and without malice. *Kent v. Bongartz*, 15 R. I., 72; *Frank v. Dessena*, 5 N. J. Law J., 185. But to come within this rule the officer or board addressed must have some interest or duty in the matter. *Hebditch v. McIlwaine*, 2 Q. B., 54 (1894); *Erber v. Dun*, 12 Fed., 526. But the right to criticize does not embrace the right to make false statements of fact, to attack the private character of an officer, or to falsely impute to him *malfeasance* or misconduct in office. *Negley v. Farrow*, 60 Md., 158. In some jurisdictions, however, it is held that even though the statements are not strictly true, the defendant is not liable if there was probable cause for the statements and no proof of express malice. *O'Rourke v. Lewiston Daily Sun Pub. Co.*, 89 Me., 310.